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Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social
Revolution and Legal Regulation
MARSHA GARRISON*
I. Introduction
Fifty years ago, nonmarital cohabitation was rare. Today, it is common.
This article analyzes the sources and results of increasing nonmarital
cohabitation as well as family law's response to this behavioral shift.
Surveying the case law, I find that, although the California Supreme
Court's widely cited decision in Marvin v. Marvin' appeared to inaugurate
a new era of expanding law and rights for nonmarital cohabitants, courts
and legislatures-both within California and outside of it-have in fact
responded to Marvin quite cautiously. Surveying the research data on
cohabitation, I conclude that this cautious approach is justified and that a
more dramatic legal response to nonmarital cohabitation is at this point
unwarranted.
II. The Cohabitation Revolution
In 1958, members of the American Bar Association's new Section of
Family Law were not expecting their membership dues to provide them
with new opportunities to master the law of cohabitation-there was no
law of cohabitation. Prostitution was regulated by the criminal code.
Common-law marriage was regulated by marriage law, and at this time
about a third of the states recognized a cohabiting couple as a married
couple if they had held themselves out as married and the evidence
showed that promises to be married had been exchanged.2
In between these two extremes, legal regulation of cohabitation was
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
2. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 45-46 (lst ed. 1968).
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sparse. Indeed, it could be boiled down to two sentences: Cohabitation
created no rights or obligations. Cohabitants could not agree to create
rights or obligations based on their intimate relationship.3
The bar on relationship-based contracts between cohabitants did not
bar other sorts of deals, however; cohabitants in most states could enter
into any arrangement that was open to noncohabitants. Thus, one cohabi-
tant might enter into a valid and binding business partnership with the
other.4 Cohabitants could also enter into legally binding contracts for non-
sexual services severable from their relationship.
5
In addition to these contract alternatives, a disappointed cohabitant
could often rely on one or another equitable doctrine for relief. The pur-
chase money resulting trust frequently protected the cohabitant who had
paid money toward the purchase of property when title was taken in the
name of his or her partner.6 Quantum meruit provided a means of obtain-
ing payment for services rendered for which the expected payment had
not been made.7 Constructive trust provided "a flexible remedy imposed
in a wide variety of situations to prevent unjust enrichment."8 These vari-
3. See, e.g., Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 247 P.2d 19 (Cal. 1952); Otis v. Freeman, 85 N.E.
168 (Mass. 1908); Jane Massey Draper, Annotation, Recovery for Services Rendered by
Persons Living in Apparent Relation of Husband and Wife Without Express Agreement for
Compensation, 94 A.L.R.3d 552 (1980). Professor Clark's 1968 treatise on family law does not
even include an entry on cohabitation. See generally CLARK, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Zorrilla, 354 P.2d 260 (Ariz. 1960) (enforcing contract to care
for rental properties in exchange for a portion of the rents); Bridges v. Bridges, 270 P.2d 69
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that an agreement to pool earnings and share joint accumu-
lations was enforceable even though performance was contemporaneous with meretricious rela-
tions); Zytka v. Dmochowski, 18 N.E.2d 332 (Mass. 1938) (finding that former cohabitant was
entitled to an accounting); see also RICHARD A. LORD, 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:23 (4th
ed. 2008) ("The fact that past cohabitation is the motive for a promise will not invalidate it.").
5. See, e.g., Chenowth v. McDowell, 226 P. 535 (Ariz. 1924); Henderson v. Spratlen, 98
P. 14 (Colo. 1908); Kurtz v. Frank, 76 Ind. 594 (1881); Emmerson v. Botkin, 109 P.531 (Okla.
1910); Stewart v. Waterman, 123 A.524 (Vt. 1924); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 589
(1932).
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 7-9; Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313 (Alaska
1964) (holding that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the amount she had contributed toward
the purchase price); Hall v. Hall, 219 P.2d 808 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (quieting title in favor
of plaintiff who had transferred title to property to cohabitant because of restriction on a pris-
oner owning property).
7. "[C]ourts use quantum meruit to compensate a person for services rendered in the
absence of a contract.. . . [The doctrine] lacks readily ascertainable rules for the determination of
the proper amount of compensation. The technique used to determine recovery varies according
to the circumstances of each case." Jeffrey L. Oakes, Comment, Article 2298, the Codification of
the Principle Forbidding Unjust Enrichment, and the Elimination of Quantum Meruit as a Basis
for Recovery in Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REv. 873, 874-75 (1996). See generally Judy Becker Sloan,
Quantum Meruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 399 (1992) (surveying history
and usage of quantum meruit doctrine). For pre-1958 cases endorsing the use of quantum meruit
principles in cases involving unmarried cohabitants, see Draper, supra note 3.
8. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 585 (6th
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ous forms of equitable relief ensured that, in many cases, one cohabitant
who had been cheated by the other could obtain recovery for some or all
of his losses.
Although family law sanctioned business contracts and provided equi-
table remedies for cohabitants, it did not provide for relationship-based
relief. The principle that cohabitation in itself-a "meretricious relation-
ship" as the courts put it during this time period-created no legal rights
or obligations flowed from several different public-policy concerns. First,
courts viewed nonmarital cohabitation as socially undesirable, and they
wanted to discourage such arrangements. Second, relational contracts
between cohabitants were widely viewed as thinly veiled prostitution con-
tracts. Third, because the parties' arrangement was private and litigation
occurred only when their relationship had broken down, solid evidence of
their understanding was often lacking. Finally, open cohabitation was
rare, and those who engaged in the practice were generally very poor, very
bohemian, or both; existing equitable remedies seemed adequate to han-
dle the legal problems such cohabitants brought to court.9
The last point deserves special emphasis. In 1958, cohabitation outside
of marriage was widely viewed as shameful, and middle-class Americans
thus cohabited very rarely. It is likely that the vast majority of the new
Family Law Section members literally did not know anyone who did
cohabit or had cohabited outside of marriage. The movies and television
offered no glimpses of such relational possibilities, and the Census
Bureau did not even bother counting cohabiting couples. What almost no
one foresaw in 1958 was the rapidity with which the stigma traditionally
attached to nonmarital cohabitation would vanish. The culturally cata-
clysmic 1960s were about to begin and, by the time the decade ended,
youthful attitudes toward cohabitation had already shifted dramatically.' 0
ed. 2000) ("The usual requirements for imposition of a constructive trust are: 1) a confidential
or fiduciary relationship; 2) a promise, express or implied, by the transferee; 3) a transfer of
property in reliance on the promise; and 4) unjust enrichment of the transferee. But the con-
structive trust remedy is not limited to these circumstances ... [and] may be imposed in situa-
tions where.., the court is moved simply by the desire to prevent unjust enrichment."); see also
5 AUSTIN W. Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 461-552 (William F. Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987). For pre-1958
cases applying constructive trust principles to cohabitants, see, for example, Cole v. Manning,
248 P. 1065 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1926); Wosche v. Kraning, 46 A.2d 220 (Pa. 1946).
9. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932); J. Thomas Oldham & David S. Caudill,
A Reconnaissance of Public Policy Restrictions upon Enforcement of Contracts Between
Cohabitants, 18 FAM. L.Q. 93 (1984) (surveying public policies in favor of restrictions on
cohabitation contracts).
10. See, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin, Toward a New Home Socioeconomics of Union
Formation, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 126, 127
(Linda J. Waite ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE TIES THAT BIND] ("[S]ince the 1970s, cohabitation
outside of marriage, which had previously been confined to the poor, has become increasingly
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Among the remarkable cultural shifts of the 1960s was a new attitude
toward premarital sex. To be more precise, the 1960s witnessed a pro-
found shift in attitudes towardfemale premarital sex. Before the 1960s, a
young man could "sow a few wild oats" without fear of serious social cen-
sure. Of course, he risked venereal disease if he patronized a prostitute.
And he risked a shotgun wedding if he impregnated a girl from a
respectable family. But if the young man got away with it-whatever the
"it" might be-he typically suffered no reputational harm. For young
women, on the other hand, premarital sex posed extraordinary risks. The
first and largest of these risks was pregnancy. The best outcome that preg-
nancy could produce was a shotgun wedding. A furtive stay at a home for
unwed mothers or an illegal, and perhaps dangerous, abortion represented
the only alternatives to that wedding. Even if pregnancy was averted, the
young woman who engaged in premarital sex risked serious reputational
loss. "Nice" girls did not; "fast" girls who did faced gossip, snickers, and
damaged marriage prospects. 1"
During the 1960s, technology and social change combined to change
these traditional norms. 2 The new birth control pill offered young
women, for the first time, near certain protection from pregnancy that was
both within their own control and divorced from the sexual act itself; in
order to obtain the safety that the pill offered, a young woman did not
even have to admit, to herself or her partner, that she had planned to
engage in intercourse. The women's movement offered this same young
woman the chance to imagine gaining what had always been male pre-
rogatives, including the possibility of premarital sex without reputational
loss. And the social upheaval that accompanied the civil rights movement
and Vietnam War produced a new world in which the vision of sex with-
out reputational harm became a reality. In 1958, nice girls did not engage
common and acceptable among the general population. It has emerged as an important part of
the union formation process, often preceding first marriages and sometimes substituting for
them.").
11. See Winston Ehrmann, Premarital Sexual Behavior and Sex Codes of Conduct with
Acquaintances, Friends, and Lovers, 38 Soc. FORCES 158 (1959); Mary Z. Ferrell et al.,
Maturational and Societal Changes in the Sexual Double-Standard: A Panel Analysis
(1967-1971; 1970-1974), 39 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 255 (1977); Ira L. Reiss, The Double
Standard in Premarital Sexual Intercourse: A Neglected Concept, 34 Soc. FORCES 226 (1956).
12. Economists George Akerlof, Janet Yellin, and Michael Katz have argued, in a widely
cited analysis of nonmarital birth, that the invention of the birth control pill coupled with the
legalization of abortion constituted a significant "technological shock" that radically shifted pat-
terns of sexual behavior. See George Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock
Childbearing in the United States, Ill Q. J. ECON. 279 (1996). However, given evidence of a
significant shift in sexual mores before the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), it seems unlikely that legal innovation was a significant factor in producing the
shift. See Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States, 51
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 873 (1989).
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in premarital sex. In 1968, many young women, particularly college-age
women, no longer wanted to be nice girls. And by 1978, the divide
between nice and naughty girls had simply disappeared.' 3
With premarital sex came open premarital cohabitation. What began as
a countercultural innovation associated with hippies and antiwar activists
became, with remarkable rapidity, an accepted part of youth culture. The
new norms for the young also rapidly spread into older age cohorts; by
1988, the parents of young cohabitants were often choosing to cohabit
themselves. 14
The numbers tell the story here. Between 1970 and 2000, the number
of U.S. unmarried-cohabitant households rose almost ten-fold, from
523,000 to 4,880,0000.15 The number of individuals who have ever
cohabited has also risen sharply; among women born between 1950 and
1954, women who came of age in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 24%
cohabited before marriage; among women born between 1965 and 1969,
55% cohabited before marriage.' 6 Nor is there any sign that the trend in
favor of premarital cohabitation has yet abated.
In recent years, the ranks of cohabitants have been further swelled by
older couples who have already been married. 17 Some of these older
cohabitants have already been divorced and thus feel hesitant about a new
marital commitment; some, making use of cohabitation's new respectabil-
ity, have chosen cohabitation over marriage for more pragmatic reasons.
The net result is that cohabitation is now a multifaceted and multi-
generational phenomenon. It includes young men and women who are
sharing living space with a dating partner in order to save money, more
committed couples who are testing the strength of their relationship,
engaged couples who are planning to marry, committed couples who view
their relationship as marital but have chosen to avoid marriage for practi-
cal reasons such as the potential loss of alimony or a surviving-spouse
entitlement, and many couples whose motives are mixed or who disagree
about the nature of their relationship. 8
13. See Thornton, supra note 12, at 884 tbl.4 (reporting that in 1965, 69% of surveyed
women and 65% of surveyed men under thirty said that premarital sex was "always" or "almost
always" wrong while, in 1972, only 24% of women and 21% of men did so).
14. See infra note 18.
15. See JASON FIELDS & LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-537, AMERICA'S
FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (2001).
16. See Kelly Raley, Recent Trends and Differentials in Marriage and Cohabitation, in THE
TIES THAT BIND, supra note 10, at 19, 23 tbl.2.1.
17. See Susan L. Brown et al., Cohabitation Among Older Adults: A National Portrait, 61
J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. ScI. S71 (2006) (reporting that more than one
million older adults, representing 4% of unmarried individuals, currently cohabit and that about
90% of these older cohabitants were previously married).
18. See Susan L. Brown, Union Transitions Among Cohabiters: The Significance of
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The extraordinary rise of cohabitation is not unique to the United
States. Equivalent developments have taken place in all common-law
countries and across the civil-law nations of northern and central
Europe.' 9 With cohabitation has come an enormous increase in nonmari-
tal birth. In 1940, 3.8% of U.S. births were nonmarital; in 2002, 33.8% of
U.S. births were.2° In some Scandinavian nations, nonmarital births now
outweigh marital births.2 '
Il. The Legal Response: A Bang or a Whimper?
A. Marvin and Its Reception
Once cohabitation moved from the fringes to the center of society, it
was less obvious that law should play the same role in regulating cohabi-
tational relationships. Thus, in the watershed Marvin case, the California
Supreme Court urged that "the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in
modern society and the social acceptance of them" required courts to
forgo the application of traditional legal standards "based on alleged
moral considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by
so many":
22
[T]he nonenforceability of agreements expressly providing for meretricious
conduct rested upon the fact that such conduct, as the word suggests, pertained
to and encompassed prostitution. To equate the nonmarital relationship of
today to such a subject matter is to do violence to an accepted and wholly dif-
ferent practice ....
Relationship Assessment and Expectations, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 833, 838 (2000) (reporting
that about 20% of cohabitants disagree about the strength of their relationship); Larry L.
Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 913, 923 (1991) (reporting same); Patrick Heuveline & Jeffrey M. Timberlake, The Role
of Cohabitation in Family Formation: The United States in Comparative Perspective, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1214 (2004) (describing range of cohabitation types); Kathleen Kiernan, The
Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 15 INT'L J.L.
POL'Y & FAM. 1 (2001) (same); Sharon Sassier & James McNally, Cohabiting Couple's
Economic Circumstances and Union Transitions: A Re-examination Using Multiple Imputation
Techniques, 32 Soc. Sci. RES. 553 (2004) (finding that 42% of surveyed cohabitants disagreed
about the strength of their relationship).
19. See Kiernan, supra note 18; Kathleen Kiernan, Unmarried Cohabitation and
Parenthood: Here to Stay? European Perspectives, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 66 (Daniel
P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY].
20. See STEPHANIE J. VENTURA & CHRISTINE BACHRACH, NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING IN THE
UNITED STATES 1940-99, 48 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. 16 (2000), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_ 16.pdf.
21. See Timothy M. Smeeding et al., The Challenge of Family System Changes for
Research and Policy, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note 19, at 1, 8 fig.1.3 (showing
increases in European nonmarital birth rates between 1960 and 2000).
22. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121-22 (Cal. 1976).
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We conclude that the judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy
based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a
nonmarital relationship should be removed.
23
Relying on the new social acceptability of cohabitation, the Marvin
majority not only approved the enforcement of explicit relational con-
tracts between cohabitants, but also authorized trial courts to "inquire into
the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates
an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture,
or some other tacit understanding between the parties. 24 In addition to
recovery based on express and implied contracts, the court also approved
continued reliance on equitable remedies--quantum meruit, constructive
trust, resulting trust-that had provided relief to cohabitants in the pre-
Marvin era, and it left open the possibility of "additional equitable reme-
dies to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship
in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate. ... 25 In sum,
Marvin promised to dramatically expand the range of rights and remedies
available to cohabiting couples. The decision also suggested that a major
shift in the legal status of cohabitation was underway.
The extended national press coverage and academic commentary that
the Marvin case received, both before and after the California Supreme
Court's decision, furthered the impression that Marvin had ushered in a
new era for cohabitants. And Marvin has undeniably assumed the stature
of a path-breaking opinion.
Marvin has been cited in approximately 200 other court decisions, about half of
which came from the California courts, and approximately 300 law review arti-
cles. It is still a fixture of family law classes, appearing as a principal case in
each of the eleven casebooks currently on the market. The term "palimony" has
entered general usage, particularly in the context of entertainers, sports figures,
and wealthy entrepreneurs. 26
There is no question that Marvin altered the way both courts and the
public think about cohabitant rights and remedies.
B. The Aftermath of Marvin
Today, Marvin represents, at least in the United States, the dominant
approach to cohabitant claims. Appellate courts in at least twenty-six states
and the District of Columbia have now approved some relational contract
23. Id. at 122.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 122 n.25.
26. Ann Lacquer Estin, Unmarried Partners and the Legacy of Marvin v. Marvin: Ordinary
Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1382-83 (2001).
316 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 42, Number 3, Fall 2008
claims between cohabitants, 27 although a few of these jurisdictions have
disapproved recovery based on an implied contract.28 Only five states have
disapproved of all forms of relief based on a cohabiting relationship.29
Perhaps surprisingly, however, Marvin's bold language has not produced
results markedly different from those permissible under pre-Marvin case
law. As Professor Ann Lacquer Estin put it, "[w]ith all its celebrity, the
Marvin decision stands more as a cultural icon than as a legal watershed."3
Consider the aftermath of the Marvin decision itself. On remand, the
trial court held a three-month trial, at the end of which it found that "no
express contract was negotiated between the parties" and that "the con-
duct of the parties. . . does not reveal any implementation of any contract
nor... give rise to an implied contract."'" The court went on to conclude
that there was no "mutual effort" that might support a recovery and that,
"in good conscience," no equitable remedies-resulting trust, construc-
tive trust, or quantum meruit-were applicable. In the court's view, the
plaintiff's relationship with wealthy, successful Lee Marvin had been
helpful to her, not hurtful. Despite its finding that there was unjust enrich-
ment and no contract, express or implied, the court nonetheless awarded
the plaintiff $104,000 in alimony "so that she may have the economic
means to reeducate herself and to learn new, employable skills or to refur-
27. See Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980); Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz.
1984); Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 2000); Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142
(Conn. 1987); Mason v. Rostad, 476 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1984); Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141
(Mass. 1998); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d
77 (Neb. 1981); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984); Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218 (N.H.
1982); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d
1154 (N.Y. 1980); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507 (Or. 1978); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090 (R.I.
2002); Hinkle v. McColm, 575 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1978); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W.
Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594
(Wyo. 1981); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Bright v. Kuehl, 650
N.E.2d 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Kerkove v. Thompson, 487 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa Ct. App.
1992); Ellis v. Berry, 867 P.2d 1063 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d
922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Dominguez v. Cruz, 617 P.2d 1322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Suggs v.
Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Mullen v. Suchko, 421 A.2d 310 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980); Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE,
SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.02 (2002) (listing decisions following
Marvin); George L. Blum, Annotation, Property Rights Arising from Relationship of Couple
Cohabiting without Marriage, 69 A.L.R. 5th 219 (1999).
28. See MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.108 (Vernon 2007);
Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1155; Tapley, 449 A.2d at 1219.
29. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979); Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931
(Miss. 1994); Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Schwegmann v.
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1981).
30. Estin, supra note 26, at 1383.
31. HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 235 (2007)
(quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3077 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).
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bish those utilized, for example, during her most recent employment and
so that she may return from her status as companion of a motion picture
star to a separate, independent but perhaps more prosaic existence."32 But
this award-one that was not sanctioned by the contract approach outlined
in Marvin-was promptly struck down on appeal.33 Michele Triola
"Marvin" walked away from the landmark decision that she had won in
the California Supreme Court with nothing.
Cohabitants who followed Michele Marvin into California courtrooms
learned that her failure to turn what looked like a favorable decision into
a solid cash recovery was not entirely due to the specifics of Michele's
case. While we have no solid evidence of how many Marvin plaintiffs
have won in the courtroom or accepted a favorable settlement, California
appellate decisions show that the Marvin requirements have been strictly
construed and that an award is by no means easy to obtain. Nor did the
California courts use Marvin as a springboard for fashioning new cohab-
itant rights and obligations.
Indeed, since Marvin, the California Supreme Court has revisited the
legal problems posed by cohabitation only rarely. I could find only two
decisions in which a supreme court majority cited Marvin for a proposi-
tion related to its substantive holding: 34 in Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp."' the court held that the claims of a discharged employee for breach
of an implied-contract promise to discharge only for good cause survived
the statute of frauds, and in Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club,36
the court held that California's civil rights act barred discrimination
against registered domestic partners by denying them benefits or services
extended to spouses. Dissenting members of the court have cited Marvin
in decisions denying cohabitants the right to maintain a claim for loss of
consortium, 37 finding that cohabitants are not protected against housing
discrimination by California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, 38 and
holding that a cohabitant who quit her job to follow her boyfriend did not
have good cause and thus was not entitled to unemployment insurance
32. Id.
33. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Ct. App. 1981).
34. Based on Shepardizing Marvin using headnotes 2-3, 7-8, 10-12, 14, 21-23, 27-28,
32-33, 35-36.
35. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
36. 115 P.3d 1212 (Cal. 2005).
37. See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988); Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct.
App. 1987); Lewis v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Ct. App. 1985); Hendrix v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (Ct. App. 1983); Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 31 (Ct. App. 1982).
38. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996); Donahue
v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1991).
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when she had not shown an imminent marriage or a marriage-related
obligation.39
California appellate courts have cited Marvin more frequently, but they
too have only rarely expanded on Marvin's central holding. In Cochran v.
Cochran,4' the appellate court held that a viable Marvin claim does not
require full-time cohabitation. But in Taylor v. Fields4' and Bergen v.
Wood,42 appellate courts disallowed Marvin claims when there had been
no cohabitation. California courts have held that a post-mortem Marvin
action does not violate a no-contest clause in the decedent cohabitant's
will, at least as long as the will does not specifically disallow such an
action. 43 But they have also held that when title to real property is at issue,
the Marvin plaintiff must establish her claim to the property by clear and
convincing evidence. 44 They have held that Marvin claims are civil
actions based on contract law4" and dismissed Marvin lawsuits that violate
the statute of limitations for contract claims.46 They have disallowed the
award of temporary alimony to a Marvin plaintiff' 7 and declined to permit
cohabitants not registered under California's Domestic Partnership Law
to make use of its dissolution procedures or rely on the putative spouse
doctrine.48 They have held that the marital communication privilege is
inapplicable to cohabitants. 49
California courts have also been fairly cautious in interpreting
Marvin's continued ban on prostitution agreements. They have disallowed
contracts that clearly involved the exchange of valuable consideration for
sex.5" Although they have concluded that agreements to have a child
together and to perform services as a bodyguard, secretary, and real estate
39. See Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904, 910 (Cal. 1983).
40. 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Ct. App. 2001).
41. 224 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Ct. App. 1986).
42. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75 (Ct. App. 1993).
43. See Estate of Black, 206 Cal. Rptr. 663, 669 (Ct. App. 1984).
44. See Tannehill v. Finch, 232 Cal. Rptr. 749, 751 (Ct. App. 1986).
45. See Schafer v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr 513, 517 (Ct. App. 1986).
46. See Kurokawa v. Blum, 245 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1988); Estate of Fincher, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 18 (Ct. App. 1981); see also Nelson v. Nevel, 201 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding
that plaintiff's contract claim was time barred but permitting her to amend complaint to include
constructive trust claims subject to four-year statute of limitations);
47. See Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 899 (Ct. App. 1993).
48. See Velez v. Smith, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 658 (Ct. App. 2006).
49. See People v. Delph, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1979).
50. See Estate of Brandl v. Mall, No. B 192529, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4955, at
* 1-2, 8-9 (June 21, 2007) (holding that alleged holographic will providing that "I leave every-
thing to [appellant] if she fucks and sucks me 1 million times before I die" was based on an ille-
gal condition precedent and thus invalid); see also Goines v. Wilkes, No. B 191720, 2007 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 2857 (Apr. 9, 2007) (limiting recovery to $600 dental bill based on prom-
issory estoppel).
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counselor did not represent impermissible sex-for-pay contracts,5 1 they
have found that an agreement to be a lover, companion, homemaker, trav-
eling companion, and cook was an invalid sex-for-hire contract.
52
Finally, like the Marvin trial court, California courts have treated the
evidentiary requirements implied in Marvin very seriously. Although
there are reported appellate decisions upholding judgments in favor of
Marvin plaintiffs, 53 there are more decisions affirming judgments against
Marvin plaintiffs where the trial court found insufficient evidence of a
cohabitation agreement or unjust enrichment.54 There are also cases in
which the appellate court overturned a trial court judgment based on
insufficient evidence of a cohabitation agreement or unjust enrichment.5 5
Courts outside of California have also tended to take a cautious
approach to claims based on cohabitation. Although the majority of U.S.
jurisdictions have followed Marvin,5 6 only one high court, in Washington,
has gone beyond Marvin's contract model to permit recovery based on the
fact of cohabitation, without any showing of unjust enrichment or an
agreement.57 Courts in other states have also been wary of expanding the
51. See Della Zoppa v. Della Zoppa, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901 (Ct. App. 2001); Whorton v.
Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988).
52. See Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981).
53. See Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Ct. App. 1986) (upholding equal prop-
erty division award in case of twelve-year cohabitation when parties held themselves out as
married, had three children, acquired substantial real property, and the evidence supported the
trial court's finding of an implied contract to share equally all property acquired during the
course of their relationship); In re Marriage of Barter, No. B142934, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 884 (Dec. 10, 2001) (upholding divorce court's award of property acquired before mar-
riage to husband based on his contributions of separate property).
54. See Miller v. Kline, No. B 193605, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 362 (Jan. 16, 2008);
In re Marriage of Bernie, No. E040127, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7035 (Aug. 28, 2007);
Schoenig v. Levin, No. C047640, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4113 (May 11, 2006); Lorch
v. Lorch, No. H026669, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11599 (Dec. 16, 2005); Koach v. Gates,
No. F044000, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10689 (Nov. 23, 2004); Ng v. Wong, No.
H023323, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 458 (Jan. 14, 2003); Robertson v. Reinhart, No.
A095025, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 204 (Jan. 8, 2003); Estate of Boben, No. A092609,
2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1398 (Nov. 21, 2001).
55. See Fontes v. McCarty, No. E039755, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11392 (Dec. 19,
2006) (reversing judgment in favor of plaintiff when trial court found that defendant's agree-
ment to convey interest in house to plaintiff was procured through undue influence); Taylor v.
Polackwich, 194 Cal. Rptr. 8 (Ct. App. 1983) (affirming judgment insofar as it denied plaintiff
girlfriend an ownership interest in defendant boyfriend's house because there had been no evi-
dence to support a constructive trust claim; reversing judgment that ordered defendant to allow
plaintiff to live in his house for a four-year period, to pay plaintiff a rehabilitative award, and to
pay plaintiff for moving costs; and holding that the rehabilitative award could not stand because
plaintiff did not have a legal or equitable basis for such relief).
56. See supra note 27.
57. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995). An intermediate appellate court
in Oregon has also held that judges have "equitable powers" to reach a "fair result" at the end
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legal status of cohabitants: they have almost invariably followed the
California Supreme Court in declining to extend to cohabitants rights
available to married couples; virtually none, for example, have extended
the right to obtain loss of consortium damages to cohabitants when a part-
ner is injured5 8 or authorized cohabitants to obtain other public benefits
available to married couples.5 9
Equally notable is the dearth of case law dealing with cohabitant
claims. One has to be cautious in toting up the number of states that today
follow Marvin for the simple reason that there are still high courts that
have not squarely considered the issue, and these invariably are not states
with small populations. In Virginia, for example, the twelfth most popu-
lous state and home to more than 7.5 million people,60 there is not a sin-
gle reported decision that cites Marvin, and I could find no reported cases
in which Virginia courts have considered the viability of a contract
between unmarried cohabitants without citing Marvin. In neighboring
Maryland, 6' the high court has cited Marvin only once, in a decision deal-
ing with an attorney disciplinary proceeding appeal. One of the charges
against the attorney in question was that he had advertised representation
in cases involving "palimony"-a type of action, the grievance commit-
tee argued, "that Maryland law had never recognized....,,62 The Maryland
Court of Appeals rejected the Attorney Grievance Commission's argu-
ment, citing its earlier decision involving a will-contract claim-a case
that was neither brought nor decided on a Marvin theory63--two decisions
made in 1937 and 1940,' and an intermediate appellate decision relying
on this early case law to enforce an oral promise to repay various business
services and loans with 1,000 shares of stock-an agreement that would
of a period of cohabitation. See Wilbur v. De Lapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
58. See Lisha M. Carlile, Note, Like Family: Rights of Nonmarried Cohabitational Partners
in Loss of Consortium Actions, 46 B.C. L. REv. 391 (2005). But see Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d
948 (N.M. 2003).
59. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 31, at 248-49; Katherine M. Forbes, Note, Time for a
New Privilege: Allowing Unmarried Cohabitating Couples to Claim the Spousal Testimony
Privilege, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 887 (2007) (noting that courts have not developed evidentiary
privilege for cohabitants).
60. See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/51000.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2008); Wikipedia, List of U.S. States by Population,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of U.S.-statesby-population (last visited Aug. 4, 2008).
61. The Maryland population is more than 5.5 million. See Wikipedia, supra note 60.
62. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Ficker, 572 A.2d 501, 506 (Md. 1990).
63. See Unitas v. Temple, 552 A.2d 1285, 1291 n.6 (Md. 1989) ("There is not a suggestion
in this case that the social relationship was meretricious. Counsel for Temple have also delib-
erately steered wide of any 'palimony' theory.").
64. See Baxter v. Wilburn, 190 A. 773 (Md. 1937); Lynch v. Rogers, 10 A.2d 619 (Md.
1940).
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have been enforceable in Maryland in the 1930s.65
Even in states that have accepted some variant of the Marvin doctrine,
reported case law is typically sparse. Consider New York, the third largest
state in the nation.66 The New York Court of Appeals ruled on the issues
raised in Marvin in 1980 in the case of Morone v. Morone;67 the court
announced that express, but not implied, relational contracts between
cohabitants were enforceable. In the twenty-eight years since Morone was
decided, New York courts have cited the decision for its substantive hold-
ing only twenty-seven times,68 and several of the citing cases do not even
deal with claims between cohabitants. 69 By contrast, New York courts
have cited the Court of Appeals's 1985 decision in O'Brien v. O'Brien,70
determining that a professional degree or license is marital property sub-
ject to distribution at divorce, for its substantive holding 249 times over
twenty-three years.7' Yet only a very small portion of divorce actions
involve professional degrees of separate assets while, under Morone, an
agreement is essential in all cohabitation claims.72
Of course, we do not know how many claims between cohabitants are
settled or tried without an opinion. But the very limited appellate case law
certainly suggests that Marvin did not open any floodgates. In sum,
Marvin did not inaugurate a new era of expanding rights for cohabitants;
courts in virtually all states have refused to go beyond the legal principles
enunciated in Marvin and many have stopped short of Marvin's bound-
aries. Courts appear to have maintained fairly strict evidentiary standards;
"[t]he case law of cohabitation makes it clear that courts will not order
compensation for services performed by one partner that can be charac-
terized as part of the ordinary give and take of a shared life. '73 And cohab-
itants themselves do not seem to have read Marvin as a signal that some
65. See Donovan v. Scuderi, 443 A.2d 121 (Md. 1982).
66. See Wikipedia, supra note 60.
67. 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980).
68. Based on Shepardizing Morone using headnote 1. (Morone has only two headnotes.)
69. See, e.g., PDK Labs, Inc. v. Krape, 716 N.Y.S.2d 323 (App. Div. 2000); Ratteni v.
Cerreta, 728 N.Y.S.2d 401 (App. Div. 2001); People ex rel. Conyers v. Dalsheim, 540 N.Y.S.2d
201 (App. Div. 1989); NCJ Cleaners, L.L.C. v. ALM Media, Inc., 844 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sup. Ct.
2007); Roth v. United Fed. of Teachers, 787 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
70. 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
71. Based on Shepardizing O'Brien using headnotes 1-12.
72. Cases that go to trial are more likely to involve professional degrees and separate prop-
erty than are settled cases, but even among this relatively wealthy group, when I reviewed judi-
cial decision-making under New York's Equitable Distribution law over the first ten years that
the statute was in effect (1984-1993), only 12% of my sample of all reported decisions in which
the property award could be determined (n=383) involved a professional degree or license. See
Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of
Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 530 tbl.A3 (1996).
73. Estin, supra note 26, at 1400.
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financial recovery should invariably, or even typically, follow the disso-
lution of a cohabitational relationship.
C. The Reasons for the Results
Cohabitant claims for financial relief have not flooded the courts for a
variety of reasons. One important factor is that cohabitation in the United
States is typically brief and transitional: approximately 60% of all U.S.
cohabitants and 70% of those in a first, premarital cohabitation marry
within five years.74 More tellingly, only about 10% of cohabitants who do
not marry are still together five years later.75 Indeed, the median duration
of cohabitation in the United States now appears to be less than 1.5
years,76 a period that is not, at this point, increasing.77
A second reason that Marvin has not spurred more litigation is that
cohabitants tend to be younger and poorer than married couples. Despite
smaller proportions of youthful cohabitants in recent years,78 the median
age of cohabitants is still considerably lower than that of marriage part-
ners. 79 At least among men, cohabitants have less education and lower
socioeconomic prospects than their married counterparts. 80 As a result of
these demographic differences, cohabitants frequently do not have valu-
able resources to fight about.
74. See M.D. BRAMLETT & W.D. MOSHER, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND
REMARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 22, 22 tbl.9 (2002). However, the likelihood that cohabita-
tion will lead to marriage appears to be declining. See Larry L. Bumpass, The Changing
Significance of Marriage in the United States, in THE CHANGING FAMILY IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE: ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES 63, 71 (Karen 0. Mason et al. eds., 1998).
75. See Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research
Themes, Findings, and Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 3 (2000) (summarizing research);
see also BRAMLETT & MOSHER, supra note 74, at 22, 22 tbl. 15 (reporting that 49% of first pre-
marital cohabitations are disrupted within five years).
76. See Heuveline & Timberlake, supra note 18, at 1223 tbl.2.
77. See Cherlin, supra note 10, at 135 (summarizing evidence).
78. See LYNNE M. CASPER & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 44-45 (2002) (stating that in 1978, 35% of cohabiting women and 38.5% of
cohabiting men were age thirty-five or older, and those numbers increased in 1998 to 44% of
cohabiting women and 48% of cohabiting men); BRAMLET & MUSHER, supra note 74, at 17-18
tbl.21.
79. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 78, at II tbl.C (noting that of women age twenty to
twenty-four, 11 % were cohabiting, and 27% were married; among women age thirty-five to
forty-four, less than 5% were cohabiting, and 68% were married).
80. See id. at 52-53 tbl.2.3 (showing that Caucasian and African-American married men
had significantly higher levels of college education and income than cohabiting men, and
Hispanic married men had higher income levels but not higher levels of college education);
Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES
53, 66 tbl.1 (1995); see also Larry Bumpass & H.H. Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and
Implications for Children's Family Contexts in the United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 32
(2000); Smock, supra note 75, at 4.
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Third, the evidence suggests that cohabitants do not typically adopt
sharing behaviors of the sort that Marvin envisions. Cohabitants are less
likely than married couples to support their partners.8 ' They are much
82more likely to split expenses instead of pooling their resources. They are
more likely than married couples to value independence.83 And, at least in
the United States, cohabitation seems to arise from practical considera-
tions far more often than from a relational commitment or agreement. For
example, in a recent, small survey of New York City cohabitants, respon-
dents overwhelmingly reported finances, convenience, and housing needs
as the reasons for their decisions to cohabit; 84 in a larger midwestern sur-
vey, none of the cohabitant interviewees indicated that cohabitation rep-
resented a commitment to the relationship. As one cohabitant put it, the
decision to cohabit meant that:
I wasn't ready... to get like, I mean, that close to somebody and I mean I lived
with her but we still had our freedom we still let each other do what we want-
ed to do so I had my space and she had her space. 85
Even the arrival of a child does not appear to alter the feeling that
cohabitation connotes independence rather than sharing. The U.S. Fragile
Family Study, which sponsored indepth interviews of a nationally repre-
sentative group of unmarried parents, found that "most of these cohabit-
ing pairs espouse a strong individualistic ethic ... in which personal hap-
piness and fulfillment hold the highest value."
86
Of course, some cohabiting relationships do involve commitment and
sharing. Surveying the data, demographers have enumerated six or seven
different cohabitation "types," ranging from a substitute for being sin-
gle-that type that seems most prevalent in the United States-to a stage
in the marriage process, to informal marriage. 87 But at least in the United
81. See Marsha Garrison, is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligations, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 840 (2005) [hereinafter Garrison, Is Consent
Necessary?] (reviewing evidence); Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters: What's Wrong with the
ALI's Domestic Partnership Proposal, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRtNCtPLES OF THE LAW OF FAmILY DISSOLuTioN 305 (Robin H.
Wilson ed., 2006) [hereinafter Garrison, Marriage Matters] (same).
82. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 81, at 840-43 (reviewing evidence);
Garrison, Marriage Matters, supra note 81, at 307-15 (same).
83. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 81, at 841-43 (summarizing evi-
dence); Garrison, Marriage Matters, supra note 81, at 310-11 (same).
84. See Sharon Sassier, The Process of Entering into Cohabiting Unions, 66 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 491, 498-501 (2004).
85. Wendy Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Measuring and Modeling Cohabitation: New
Perspectives from Qualitative Data, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 989, 999 (2005).
86. Kathryn Edin et al., A Peek Inside the Black Box: What Marriage Means for Poor
Unmarried Parents, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1007, 1011 (2004).
87. See Heuveline & Timberlake, supra note 18, at 1216-18; Kiernan, supra note 18; see
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States, cohabitation that creates expectations of financial interdependence
and continued sharing seems to be relatively rare.
IV. Looking Ahead: Is a Legal Revolution Warranted?
At the time Marvin was decided, the approach adopted by the
California Supreme Court represented a more expansive approach to
cohabitation-based claims than courts-both in the United States and
abroad-had previously adopted. Today, in an international context,
Marvin offers a fairly conservative legal model. Courts and legislatures in
a number of other developed nations have developed a "conscriptive"
approach that bases cohabitant obligation on status instead of contract.88
The conscriptive model imposes on the cohabiting couple that has chosen
to avoid marriage some or all of the obligations the couple would have
incurred had they chosen to marry. Various Canadian provinces, for
example, now impose a support obligation on cohabitants who have lived
together for periods ranging from one to three years.89 All Australian
states have adopted legislation that extends marital property rights to
cohabitants who have a common child or have lived together for at least
two years. 90 And New Zealand has extended all of the rights and obliga-
tions of marriage to couples who have been "de facto partners" for three
years. 9'
In the United States, the conscriptive model has thus far met with little
success. Although some states have adopted registration schemes that per-
also Anne Barlow & Grace James, Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation in 21st Century
Britain, 67 MOD. L. REV. 143, 157-61 (2004) (quoting British cohabitants describing range of
reasons for cohabitation).
88. I have used the term "conscriptive" to emphasize the fact that the obligations imposed
by laws of this type are both compulsory and involuntary. The Canadian Law Reform
Commission has referred to such laws as ascriptive, emphasizing the fact that they impute mar-
ital status to the unmarried. See LAW COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING
AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001), http://tabletology.com/docs/
beyond-conjugality.pdf.
89. See Nicholas Bala, Controversy Over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage
and Other Adult Interdependent Relationships, 29 QUEEN'S L.J. 41, 45-49 (2003) (describing
provincial support rules). The only exception is Quebec. See id. at 48-49. A cohabitant right to
share property accrued during the relationship appears to be available only to couples in the
Northwest Territories. See Family Law Act, S.N.W.T. 1997, ch. 18, § 1.
90. See Lindy Wilmott et al., De Facto Relationships Property Adjustment Law-A
National Direction, 17 AUsTL. J. FAM. L. 1, 2-5 (2003) (describing differences in state rules).
91. See Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001, http://www.austlii.edu.aulnzlegis/
consolact/paa2001378.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2008). For descriptions of the legislation and
its development, see Bill Atkin, The Challenge of Unmarried Cohabitation-The New Zealand
Response, 37 FAM. L.Q. 303 (2003); Virginia Grainer, What's Yours Is Mine: Reform of the
Property Division Regime for Unmarried Couples in New Zealand, I I PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
285 (2002).
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mit some cohabitants to opt into status-based rights and obligations, only
the state of Washington has adopted a cohabitant obligation model in
which rights arise simply from the fact of cohabitation. 92 The American
Law Institute (ALI) has urged that states should shift course and abandon
Marvin's contractual approach in favor of the conscriptive alternative.
93
The ALI's position "reflects a judgment that it is usually just to apply to
[cohabitants] . . .the property and support rules applicable to divorcing
spouses, that individualized inquiries are usually impractical or unduly
burdensome, and that it therefore makes more sense to require parties to
contract out of these property and support rules than to contract into
them. 94
However, as I have explained in much greater detail elsewhere, all the
evidence we have suggests that the ALI is wrong. It supports continuation
of a cautious, contract-based approach instead of a conscriptive model."
First, as the typically short duration and relatively rare sharing expecta-
tions suggest, cohabitation and marriage are simply not equivalent states.
The ALI offers no evidence to support its claim of equivalence, and there
is none: the research data unequivocally show that, in the United States,
cohabitation and marriage typically produce different behaviors and have
different social meanings.
9 6
Second, conscriptive schemes either create serious risks of misclassifi-
cation or present daunting fact-finding challenges. Those schemes that
rely on individualized fact-finding recreate and exaggerate the fact-find-
ing problems that have led most states to abandon the common-law-
marriage doctrine; the other, probably more numerous, schemes that rely
on the duration of cohabitation or the birth of a common child as a trigger
for rights and obligations resolve most of these fact-finding difficulties but
reduce individual autonomy and risk the imposition of obligations on indi-
viduals who lack marital understandings or-worse-who have affirma-
tively chosen to avoid marital obligations by remaining single.9
Third, the research evidence shows that marriage is associated with a
range of health, wealth, and happiness benefits for both adult partners and
their children, benefits that might be lost if increasing numbers of couples
92. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995).
93. See Am. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.01 et seq. (2002).
94. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
95. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 81, at 848-54 (reviewing evidence);
Garrison, Marriage Matters, supra note 81, at 315-18 (same).
96. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 81, at 839-48 (reviewing evidence);
Garrison, Marriage Matters, supra note 81, at 307-15 (same).
97. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 81, at 848-64 (reviewing evidence);
Garrison, Marriage Matters, supra note 81, at 315-27 (same).
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spend more time in cohabiting relationships and bear children within
them. Researcher after researcher has reported that married individuals
typically live longer, happier, and healthier lives than the unmarried.98
Married men and women do better economically than their unmarried
counterparts; they have a higher savings rate and thus accrue greater
wealth than the unmarried.99
The marital advantage also provides substantial benefits to a couple's
children. Children born to cohabiting parents are two to four times more
likely to experience their parents' separation than are children born to
married parents.°00 Because of the greater stability that marriage provides,
marital children are exposed to many fewer financial,' 0' physical,0 2 and
98. See Marsha Garrison, The Decline of Formal Marriage: Inevitable or Reversible?, 41
FAM. L.Q. 491, 495 (2007) (reviewing evidence).
99. See id. at 495-96.
100. See, e.g., Cynthia Osborne et al., Instability in Fragile Families: The Role of Race-
Ethnicity, Economics, and Relationship Quality 12-13 (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing,
Working Paper No. 2004-17FF, 2004) (finding in nationally representative study that, even after
controlling for the "mother's characteristics, parents' fertility history, the couple's economic
characteristics, and relationship quality .... [p]arents who are cohabiting at their child's birth
still have over twice the odds of separation as compared to parents who are married .... ");
Wendy Manning et al., The Relative Stability of Cohabiting and Marital Unions for Children,
23 Pop. RES. & POL'Y REv. 135 (2004) (finding that U.S. White, Black, and Hispanic children
born to cohabiting parents experience greater levels of instability than children born to married
parents and that White and Hispanic children whose cohabiting parents marry do not experience
the same levels of family stability as those born to married parents); Wendy Manning & Ronald
E. Bulanda, Cohabitation and Family Trajectories, in HANDBOOK OF MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN
FAMILY RESEARCH 199 (Sandra Hofferth & Lynne Casper eds., 2006) (reporting that, by age
fourteen, three-fifths of children who lived with two cohabiting biological parents experienced
family change in contrast to only one-third of children who lived with two married biological
parents); R. Kelly Raley & Elizabeth Wildsmith, Cohabitation and Children's Family
Instability, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 210 (2004); see also Kiernan, supra note 18, at 84 fig.3.6
(showing European marriage and cohabitation dissolution rates by country).
101. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 78, at 111-12 fig.4.3 (reporting, in 1998, 6.9%
poverty rate for married-parent households and 38.7% rate for single-mother households).
Noncustodial divorced and never-married parents are also less likely to pass wealth on to their
adult children. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., et al., The Effect of Divorce on Intergenerational
Transfers: New Evidence, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 319 (1995); Nadine F. Marks, Midlife Marital
Status Differences in Social Support Relationships with Adult Children and Psychological Well-
Being, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 5 (1995).
102. Rates of physical and sexual abuse are significantly higher when children live with an
adult stepparent or cohabitant. See Michael N. Stiffman et al., Household Composition and Risk
of Fatal Child Maltreatment, 109 PEDIATRICS 615 (2002) (reporting that children residing in
households with an unrelated adult were eight times more likely to die of maltreatment than
children in households with two biological parents and that risk of maltreatment death was not
increased for children living with a sole biological parent); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved
Trust: Reflections on the ALI's Treatment of de Facto Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
90 (Robin H. Wilson ed., 2006) (reviewing evidence).
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educational risks;1"3 these lower risks are associated with higher levels of
well-being." There is also evidence that the advantages conferred by mar-
ital childbearing and rearing transcend the specific benefits associated with
residential and economic stability. For example, married fathers appear to
be more involved and spend more time with their children than unmarried
fathers; if parental separation occurs, these fathers see their children more
often and pay child support more regularly." 5 The advantages of marriage
appear to extend into a child's adulthood and even to his or her children.
Researchers have documented a strong link between growing up in a sin-
gle-parent household and adult income, health, and emotional stability.'
0 6
A number of studies have also found that both men and women who expe-
rience a single-parent household as children are more likely, as adults, to
experience marital discord and to divorce or separate.'
0 7
103. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT
HURTS, WHAT HELPS 39-63 (1994) (reviewing evidence); Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara
McLanahan, Father Absence and Child Well-Being: A Critical Review, in THE FUTURE OF THE
FAMILY, supra note 19, at 116, 120-22 (same).
104. See Paul R. Amato & Jacob Cheadle, The Long Reach of Divorce: Divorce and Child
Well-Being Across Three Generations, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 191, 193 (2005) (summarizing
studies); Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 103, at 122-25 (same).
105. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 78, at 46 (reporting that children whose parents
never married see their fathers less frequently after parental separation); Marcy Carlson et al.,
Unmarried But Not Absent: Fathers' Involvement with Children After a Nonmarital Birth (Ctr.
for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 2005-07, 2005) (finding that parents'
relationship status at child's birth is key predictor of paternal involvement); Lingxin Hao,
Family Structure, Private Transfers, and the Economic Well-Being of Families with Children,
75 Soc. FORCES 269 (1996) (finding that married fathers were more likely to pay child support);
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Children, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 222 (2007) (finding no differences in child well-being for
children living in cohabiting stepfamilies and cohabiting biological-parent households); Susan
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66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 351 (2004) (reporting that children living in cohabiting-parent families
experienced worse outcomes, on average, than those residing with married-parent families;
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The benefits of marriage are not, of course, invariable. So-called
"selection effects" explain away a significant portion of the marital advan-
tage. °8 Remarriage does not confer the same advantages as a first mar-
riage. 0 9 Moreover, for both adults and children, the marital advantage is
concentrated in low-conflict relationships. Researchers have found that
the continuation of a high-conflict marriage is negatively associated with
health and happiness;" 0 indeed, longitudinal surveys show that "parents'
marital unhappiness and discord have a broad negative impact on virtual-
ly every dimension of offspring well-being."'
However, despite these important caveats, the evidence strongly sug-
gests that the marital advantage is real and that it persists across national,
cultural, and socioeconomic boundaries." 2 Even in Scandinavia, which
has the longest experience with cohabitation as a mainstream family form,
demographers continue to find that marital childbearing is associated with
much greater childhood stability," 13 smaller risks to youth and adult well-
108. See Garrison, supra note 98, at 498-99 (reviewing research).
109. See id. at 498 (reviewing research).
110. See J.K. Kiecolt-Glaser & T.L. Newton, Marriage and Health: His and Hers, 127
PSYCHOL. BULL. 472 (2001) (finding that unhappy marriages have negative physical-health con-
sequences); Catherine E. Ross et al., Reconceptualizing Marital Status as a Continuum of Social
Attachment, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 129 (1995) (finding that individuals with unhappy rela-
tionships have higher distress levels than people without partners); Debra Umberson et al., You
Make Me Sick: Marital Quality and Health over the Life Course (Population Research Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 03-04-05, 2003-2004), http://www.prc.utexas.edu/working-papers/wp-pdf
/030405.pdf (reviewing evidence).
111. AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 107, at 219.
112. See, e.g., Donna K. Ginther & Madeline Zavodny, Is the Male Marriage Premium Due
to Selection? The Effect of Shotgun Weddings on the Return to Marriage, 14 J. Pop. ECON. 313
(2001) (finding that "at most 10% of the estimated marriage premium [in men's wages] is due
to selection"); H.K. Kim & P.C. McHenry, The Relationship Between Marriage and
Psychological Well-Being-A Longitudinal Analysis, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES 885 (2002) (stating that
data that "confirmed the strong effects of marital status on psychological well-being, support-
ing the protection perspective," indicated that "the transition to cohabiting did not have the same
beneficial effects as marriage for psychological well-being" and produced "weak and inconsis-
tent" evidence of selection effects); Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 103, at 126-30,
130 (analyzing selection effects and finding that they "do not account for all the differences in
children, families, and subsequent outcomes"); Pamela J. Smock et al., The Effect of Marriage
and Divorce on Women's Economic Well-Being, 64 AM. Soc. REV. 794, 809 (1999) (stating that
"the economic benefits of marriage are large, even above and beyond the characteristics of those
who marry").
113. See An-Magritt Jensen & Sten-Erik Clausen, Children and Family Dissolution in
Norway: The Impact of Consensual Unions, 10 CHILDHOOD 65 (2003) (finding that children of
Norwegian cohabiting parents run a much higher risk of dissolution compared to children in
marital unions and that "this risk is not diminishing as cohabitation becomes more wide-
spread"); Kiernan, supra note 18, at 84 fig.3.6 (showing that 6% of Swedish marital unions and
25% of nonmarital unions dissolve within five years after the birth of a first child).
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being,114 and lower rates of divorce and nonmarital childbearing.1 15 There
is also evidence that, even after controlling for observable characteristics
like education, academic test scores, and premarital pregnancy, marriage
contributes significantly to living standards, "not only relative to single
parents living alone but also compared to parents in cohabiting relation-
ships and single parents living with other adult relatives." '16 As family
sociologist Paul Amato has put it, "the evidence consistently indicates that
children with two happily and securely married parents have a statistical
advantage over children raised in other family groups." '117 And "because
we all have an interest in the well-being of children, it is reasonable for
social institutions (such as the state) to attempt to increase the proportion
of children raised by married parents with satisfying and stable mar-
riages." 
1 8
114. See Kyrre Breivik & Dan Olweus, Children of Divorce in a Scandinavian Welfare
State: Are They Less Affected than US Children?, 47 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCH. 61 (2006) (based
on study of more than 4,000 twelve- to fifteen-year-old children in Norway, concluding that the
negative associations between parental divorce and various adverse child outcomes were "gen-
erally very similar in Norway and the United States in spite of the great differences in family
policy and welfare benefits for single mothers"); Jan 0. Jonsson & Michael Gahler, Family
Dissolution, Family Reconstitution, and Children's Educational Careers: Recent Evidence for
Sweden, 34 DEMOGRAPHY 277, 287 (1997) (finding that, even after controlling for all inde-
pendent variables, children of divorced and separated parents and children living in reconstitut-
ed families have low school-continuation propensities compared to children living with both
biological parents); Helen Hansagi et al., Parental Divorce: Psychosocial Well-Being, Mental
Health and Mortality During Youth and Young Adulthood: A Longitudinal Study of Swedish
Conscripts, 10 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 335 (2000) (reporting that in a group of Swedish conscripts,
several indicators of low levels of well-being and mental illness, including alcoholism, were
significantly correlated with parental divorce even after adjustment for antecedents and other
factors); Ingunn Storksen et al., Marriages and Psychological Distress Among Adult Offspring
of Divorce: A Norwegian Study, 48 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCH. 467 (2007) (based on study of
more than 8,000 adolescents, concluding that parental divorce was associated with significant-
ly higher mean levels and larger variances in adolescent problems and that, in general, these
effects persisted after controlling for demographic factors); Gunilla Ringback Weitoft et al.,
Mortality, Severe Morbidity, and Injury in Children Living with Single Parents in Sweden: A
Population-Based Study, 361 LANCET 289 (2003) (reporting, based on analysis of almost a mil-
lion cases and controlling for factors such as socioeconomic status and parental mental health,
that Swedish children in single-parent households showed significantly increased risks of "all
adverse outcomes analyzed, including psychiatric disease, suicide or suicide attempt, injury,
and addiction"); see also Taru H. Makikyro et al., Hospital-Treated Psychiatric Disorders in
Adults with a Single-Parent and Two-Parent Family Background: A 28-Year Follow-Up of the
1966 Northern Finland Cohort, 37 FAM. PROCESS 335 (1998).
115. See Kathleen Kiernan, Redrawing the Boundaries of Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
980, 983 (2004).
116. ROBERT I. LERMAN, MARRIED AND UNMARRIED PARENTHOOD AND ECONOMIC WELL-
BEING: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF A RECENT COHORT 32 (2002), http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/410540_Parenthood.pdf; see also Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Love and
Money? The Impact of Family Structure on Family Income, 15 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 57 (2005).
117. Paul Amato, Tension Between Institutional and Individual Views of Marriage, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 959, 962-63 (2004).
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In addition to their other disadvantages, conscriptive schemes conflict
with social policies favoring formal marriage and marital childbearing by
suggesting that public support for marriage is declining. This is undesir-
able because "bandwagon" effects often play an important role in deter-
mining public opinion, and public opinion, over time, plays an important
role in determining private attitudes and behavior." 9 A set of British
experiments demonstrates just how large this bandwagon effect can be.
The researchers gave two sets of research subjects, all unaware of the
research experiment, information about public attitudes toward abortion.
One group was told that public attitudes were becoming more permissive,
the other that public attitudes were becoming more disapproving. The per-
sonal views of individuals in both groups on tightening restrictions on
abortion were then solicited; 12% more of the group told that attitudes
were becoming more permissive expressed opposition to tightening
restrictions. 20 In other words, a perception about public opinion appears
to have swayed the opinions of more than 10% of the research subjects.
And "[e]ach new person on [an] . . .upward bandwagon induces addi-
tional people to climb on."' 12 1 Of course, the fact that individuals expect
their own position to be a minority view does not necessarily make them
abandon that position. But most of us can be swayed by our expectations
about the views of others, with the result that a major shift in public atti-
tudes can complete its course with remarkable speed.
Consider the rapid shift in attitudes toward premarital sex noted in Part
I: in 1965, 69% of surveyed women and 65% of surveyed men under age
thirty said that premarital sex was "always" or "almost always" wrong; in
1972, only 24% of women and 21% of men did so. 2 2 A similar, although
somewhat less dramatic shift in attitudes toward marriage and divorce
took place during the same time period: in the early 1960s, 80% of the
public agreed that "a couple should stay together" for the sake of the chil-
dren; by the 1980s, agreement with this statement had dropped to 50%.23
As these examples demonstrate, if individuals believe that public opinion
about formal marriage is increasingly dismissive, individuals without
119. The "bandwagon" phenomenon is the subject of a large literature. See generally JAMES
S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990); STEPHEN R.G. JONES, THE ECONOMICS OF
CONFORMISM (1984); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978). See
also TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION 69-82 (1995).
120. See Catherine Marsh, Back on the Bandwagon: The Effect of Opinion Polls on Public
Opinion, 15 BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 51 (1984).
121. KURAN, supra note 119, at 71.
122. See Thornton, supra note 12, at 884 tbl.4.
123. See Larry Bumpass, The Changing Context of Parenting in the United States,
PARENTHOOD IN AMERICA, 1999, http://parenthood.library.wisc.edu/Bumpass/Bumpass.html.
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strongly held views on the subject may well become more dismissive
themselves. Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that the low marriage
rate in Quebec-a rate that is about half that of the other Canadian
provinces124 -has been induced, in part, by such a bandwagon effect.
125
The cautious approach to cohabitant claims and status that American
courts have thus far taken therefore appears to be not only warranted, but
desirable. Given the public and private advantages associated with formal
marriage, the variety of cohabiting relationships and attendant difficulty
of drafting standards that separate relationships involving expectations of
sharing from the majority that do not give rise to such expectations, and
the risk of creating bandwagon effects that might reduce public support
for formal marriage and marital childbearing, there is every reason for
courts and legislatures to remain cautious.
124. See Statistics Canada, Marriages 2003, THE DAILY, Jan. 11, 2007, http://www.stat-
can.ca/Daily/English/070117/ d070117a.htm (showing marriage rates of 2.9 per 1,000 popula-
tion in Quebec and rates of 4.9 (Manitoba) or higher in all other Canadian provinces except the
frontier provinces of Nunavit and Northwest Territories). Correspondingly, the proportion of
adults living in nonmarital relationships is double the proportion in the rest of Canada. See
Rejean Lachapelle, The High Prevalence of Cohabitation Among Franco-phones: Some
Implications for Exogamous Couples (2007) (unpublished paper presented at 2007 annual meet-
ing of the Canadian Population Society) (on file with author); Benoit Laplante, The Rise of
Cohabitation in Quebec: Power of Religion and Power Over Religion, 31 CAN. J. Soc. 1 (2006).
125. See Garrison, supra note 98, at 512-16 (summarizing evidence).

